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NOTES
RIGHT TO COUNSEL/CRIMINAL LAW—WISHING FOR
RIGHTS: INTERPRETING THE ARTICLE 12 RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
MASSACHUSETTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA
INTRODUCTION
Factually, little separated Jesse Montejo from Robert Jackson
and Rudy Bladel.1 All were charged with murder and appointed
counsel at their respective arraignments.2 Before Montejo, Jack
son, or Bladel had the opportunity to meet their attorneys, the po
lice sought them out for interrogation purposes, even though all
three had been vigorously interrogated prior to arraignment.3 At
the police-initiated interrogation, still prior to meeting their attor
neys, Montejo, Jackson, and Bladel signed Miranda waivers4 and
thereafter made confessions that were admitted into evidence
1. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 (2009); Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625, 627-28 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2079.
2. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28.
3. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28. Prior to arraignment,
detectives interrogated Jesse Montejo from the afternoon of September 6th into the
early morning of September 7th. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082. Prior to Bladel’s arraign
ment, the police interrogated him the evening of his arrest. Jackson, 474 U.S. at 627.
Notably, when Bladel was arraigned, the detective in charge of Bladel’s investigation
was present and therefore knew of Bladel’s appointment of counsel. Id. After Bladel’s
arraignment he was taken back to the county jail, and three days later two police detec
tives came to the jail to interrogate him. Id. Similarly, Jackson was interrogated at
length prior to his arraignment and during the arraignment the police involved in his
investigation were present. Therefore, the police were undoubtedly aware that Jackson
had been appointed counsel. Id. at 628.
4. Under Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court created “prophylactic protec
tion of the right against compelled self-incrimination.” Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089 (cit
ing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). Under Miranda, a suspect in a
custodial interrogation, before being questioned, must be informed that: “(1) they have
the right to remain silent; (2) their statements may be used against them at trial; (3)
they have the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and (4) if they
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed.” Custodial Interrogations, 36 GEO.
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 168, 169 (2007). A Miranda waiver occurs when an ac
cused gives up his rights to remain silent and have counsel present during questioning.
Charles Alan Wright & Andrew D. Leipold, The Miranda Rules—Waiver and Invoca
tion of Miranda Rights, 1 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 76 (4th ed. 2010). Since June of
2010, the Supreme Court has held that defendants’ silence is enough to constitute an
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against each of them at their individual trials;5 each was found
guilty of murder.6 All three defendants appealed their convictions,
and their cases made it to the United States Supreme Court.7
Fortunately for Jackson and Bladel, their appeals were heard
together in 1986, at a time when the Supreme Court concluded it
was imperative to protect the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the
right to counsel.8 The Court held that both Jackson’s and Bladel’s
Miranda waivers were invalid and that the police-initiated interro
gations violated their Sixth Amendment rights.9 Finding the need
to safeguard the Sixth Amendment, the Court established a brightline rule making post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to
counsel at a police-initiated interrogation presumptively invalid.10
Fast-forward twenty-six years, to 2009, when the Supreme
Court heard Jesse Montejo’s appeal.11 Montejo’s argument relied
on the bright-line rule that had protected both Jackson’s and
Bladel’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.12 Unfortunately for
Montejo the Court rejected his argument, and did away with the
rule that was established twenty-six years earlier.13 Overruling the
Jackson rule, the Supreme Court granted defendants in factually
similar situations to Montejo, Jackson, and Bladel one glimmer of
hope: “[i]f a State wishes,” it may continue to adhere to the Jackson
rule under its state constitution.14
While Montejo has affected “a sea change in the law,”15 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has held that the Mas
sachusetts Declaration of Rights can afford its citizens greater pro
“implicit” Miranda waiver, thus eliminating the need for defendants to expressly waive
their Miranda rights. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010).
5. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28.
6. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28. The most serious
conviction was that of Jesse Montejo, who was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082.
7. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082-83; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28.
8. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 (finding the need for additional safeguards to
protect a defendant’s assertion of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel at an
arraignment).
9. Id. at 635-36.
10. See id. at 636.
11. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2079.
12. See id. at 2082-83.
13. Id. at 2091.
14. Id. at 2089 (“If a State wishes to abstain from requesting interviews with rep
resented defendants when counsel is not present, it obviously may continue to do so.”).
15. Commonwealth v. Tlasek, 930 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). The
court used this phrase to describe the difference in the law pre-Montejo and postMontejo:
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tection than the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.16
This holding gives the Massachusetts judiciary the power to stop the
sea change and to protect the right to counsel, which is guaranteed
to every criminal defendant in Article 12 of the Massachusetts Dec
laration of Rights (Article 12).17 In order to protect the right to
counsel, under the state constitution the Massachusetts judiciary
should maintain the long-standing prohibition against police-initi
ated interrogations of represented defendants outside the presence
of their attorneys.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the concept of “ju
dicial federalism,” and then takes a historical look at the Massachu
setts Constitution. Part I concludes with an in-depth evaluation of
Article 12 and instances in which the SJC has afforded Massachu
setts citizens greater protection than the Sixth Amendment. Part II
focuses on United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Sixth Amendment leading up to Michigan v. Jackson, and Jackson’s
subsequent overruling in Montejo v. Louisiana, and the repercus
sions for the States. Part III focuses on why it is imperative for the
protection of a defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel that the SJC
continue the prohibition on police-initiated post-arraignment inter
rogations. Finally, Part IV illuminates the broad implications of fol
lowing Montejo, arguing that sound policy would be advanced by
adherence to Massachusetts precedent.
I. STATE COURT POWER AND THE
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION
Part I of this Note discusses judicial federalism, a concept that
allows states, under their state constitutions, to provide their citi
zens greater protection than the U.S. Constitution.18 This Part then
delves into the ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution and
At the time of the motion judge’s ruling, case law clearly established that,
absent the consent of counsel, the police could not initiate an interrogation
regarding a charge for which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had at
tached and been asserted, regardless of whether they had secured a valid Mi
randa waiver. However, in May, 2009, the United States Supreme Court
effected [sic] a sea change in the law when it overruled Michigan v. Jackson.
Under Montejo, a valid Miranda waiver suffices to waive one’s Sixth Amend
ment right to counsel.
Id. (citations omitted).
16. Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982) (“The Massa
chusetts Declaration of Rights can, and in this case does, provide greater safeguards
than the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.”).
17. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.
18. See infra Part I.A.
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the history behind the right to counsel in Massachusetts, concluding
with SJC decisions in which Article 12 has been held to be more
expansive than the Sixth Amendment.
A. American Federalism
The Supremacy Clause requires states to afford their citizens
“no fewer rights than the U.S. Constitution demands.”19 However,
this mandate “do[es] no more than establish the minimum protec
tion owed to individuals against state government actions.”20 State
courts have the power, under their own constitutions, to provide
greater protection than that afforded by the U.S. Constitution21
through a process known as “judicial federalism.”22
One of the best-known articles advocating for state courts to
safeguard individual liberties through judicial federalism was writ
ten by a Supreme Court Justice.23 In his famous and influential ar
ticle, Justice Brennan called on state courts to not be satisfied with
affording their citizens the “full protections of the federal Constitu
19. Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 55
(2006).
20. Arthur Leavens, State Constitutionalism: State-Court Deference or Disso
nance?, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 81, 88-89 (2011) (recognizing that “[s]tate courts are
free . . . to interpret and apply the provisions of their respective state constitutions that
protect those same rights. If the state court interprets these protections to be greater
than their federal counterparts, [they] prevail”).
21. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (acknowledging that “a
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions . . . than those this
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards”). Not only is a state
free to afford more protection, but Justice Brennan was of the belief
that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of ques
tions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law . . . .
[F]or only if [the Court’s decisions] are found to be logically persuasive and
well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying spe
cific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as
guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
22. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an
Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (2004).
23. Brennan, supra note 21, at 491. Further, Brennan recognized his approval in
the fact that
more and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of
provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even
more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.
This is surely an important and highly significant development for our consti
tutional jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism.
Id. at 495.
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tion” and nothing more.24 Brennan’s argument for judicial federal
ism was supported by the fact that individual liberties guaranteed
by state constitutions require protection that “often extend[s] be
yond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of fed
eral law.”25 To protect constitutional liberties, federalism
distributes significant power to both the state and federal govern
ments, enabling “each to monitor and check the abuses of the
other.”26 When a state court decides to exercise its power to afford
citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions,
the decision is “not even reviewable by, [sic] the Supreme Court of
the United States.”27
Considering this significant constitutional power given to the
states, the question arises as to how state courts should exercise it.28
This question becomes even more pronounced in a situation where
the text of both the state and federal constitutional provisions are
virtually identical29 and even more challenging when the Supreme
Court has already interpreted the U.S. Constitution in a particular
matter.
There is much scholarly debate as to “whether states should
develop their own constitutional traditions or should instead adhere
to federal doctrines . . . [with] answers, ranging from always to
sometimes to never.”30 Justice Brennan advocated that states
should only defer to Supreme Court precedent when the decisions
“are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due
regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitu
24. Id. at 491.
25. Id.
26. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights As Resistance to National
Power: Toward A Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1007
(2003).
27. Brennan, supra note 21, at 501. This is because the United States Supreme
Court is “utterly without jurisdiction to review such state decisions.” Id.
28. See Leavens, supra note 20, at 89-92 (discussing when state judges should
defer to Supreme Court precedent).
29. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional
Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 390 (1998) (discussing a state’s constitutional “identity” which
becomes central in a situation “concerning the construction of provisions in a state con
stitution that mirror clauses in the Federal Constitution”); see also Arthur Leavens,
Prophylactic Rules and State Constitutionalism, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 416 (2011)
(“Boiled down, the question is, on what basis does a state court interpret a state consti
tutional provision, couched in virtually the same language and often with the same his
tory as that of its federal counterpart, and decide that the state provision provides
greater protection?”).
30. Schapiro, supra note 29, at 390.
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tional guarantees.”31 The remainder of this Note explores how the
Massachusetts judiciary has addressed the issue of judicial federal
ism in the context of the constitutional right to counsel, and recom
mends that the Massachusetts judiciary continue adherence to
Massachusetts precedent and afford their citizens greater protec
tion than provided by Montejo v. Louisiana.
B. The Massachusetts Constitution and Article 12
When a state court exercises its power to afford greater consti
tutional protection through judicial federalism, often the court will
rely on state constitutional history as a basis for the exercise of this
power.32 However, state courts rarely “resort to the state’s consti
tutional history in the way that federal courts routinely do.”33 This
section provides a brief discussion of the ratification of the Massa
chusetts Constitution, not as a basis for the Massachusetts judiciary
to exercise its power through judicial federalism, but rather in an
effort to provide an understanding of the constitutional history be
hind the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, before focusing on
Article 12.
The Massachusetts Constitution holds the distinction as the
world’s oldest, still-governing constitution.34 Ratified in 1780,35 the
31. Brennan, supra note 21, at 502.
32. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 761, 793 (1992).
33. Id. In Gardner’s article he analyzed seven different states, one of which was
Massachusetts. Id. Gardner noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has been silent on
the Massachusetts Constitution’s history, leading to the conclusion that the court does
not use the Massachusetts Constitution’s history as a basis “for divergent interpreta
tions of the state constitution.” Id. But see Honorable Roderick L. Ireland, How We
Do it in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
has Interpreted its State Constitution to Address Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL.
U.L. REV. 405, 407 (2004) (discussing that one of the SJC’s factors in deciding when to
defer to the Supreme Court is the history of the constitution).
34. Fitzpatrick, supra note 22, at 1834 (2004); see also BENJAMIN W. LABAREE,
COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS–A HISTORY 308-09 (Milton M. Klein & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1979) (“John [Adams] was in his element, having at last been given the opportu
nity to put into practice the governmental theories he had cherished all his life . . . .
During the autumn and winter of 1779-80 Adams would work a foundation for govern
ment in Massachusetts that (with numerous amendments) is still in existence today, two
centuries later.”).
35. LABAREE, supra note 34, at 312. The ratification of the Massachusetts Consti
tution meant that, “[a]t long last Massachusetts had a constitution befitting its status as
a free and independent state.” Id. Before the constitution was ratified, it was sent to
the towns for approval and accompanying the constitution was an address which set
forth the principles which it was based on: “Only ‘by accommodating ourselves to each
other, and individually yielding particular and ever favorite opinions of smaller moment
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Massachusetts Constitution was used as one of the models when the
United States Constitution was drafted in 1787.36 Markedly, unlike
other states whose constitutions were written and enacted by the
state legislatures, the Massachusetts Constitution was written by a
special convention.37 This unique arrangement enabled the Massa
chusetts Constitution to “draw its authority clearly and unequivo
cally from the sovereign people.”38 Because the Massachusetts
Constitution drew its authority directly from the people it embod
ied their values and aspirations,39 making it truly a constitution by
the people.
The Massachusetts Constitution consists of three distinct parts:
the Preamble, the Declaration of Rights, and the Frame of Govern
ment.40 The Preamble ends with the statement: “We . . . the people
of Massachusetts . . . do agree upon, ordain and establish, the fol
lowing,” which was later incorporated into the U.S. Constitution.41
The Declaration of Rights was “the predecessor to the federal Bill
of Rights . . . [and] was long regarded by the Supreme Judicial

to essential principles . . . would Massachusetts soon ‘be blessed with such a constitution
as those are intitled [sic] to, who have struggled hard for freedom and independence.’”
Id. at 309.
36. Ireland, supra note 33, at 407; see also Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d
548, 555 (Mass. 1985) (acknowledging that“[t]he Constitution of the Commonwealth
preceded and is independent of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, portions
of the Constitution of the United States are based on provisions in the Constitution of
the Commonwealth”); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 140 (2010).
37. MAIER, supra note 36, at 139. The constitution that was adopted in 1780 was
not the first constitution to be written in Massachusetts. Id. Interestingly, the first Mas
sachusetts Constitution was drafted by the legislature in 1778, and was unequivocally
rejected by the people of Massachusetts. Id. at 138-39. One of the most significant
problems with the 1778 constitution was that it was drafted by the legislature, “[a]s the
town of Concord explained, the body that forms a constitution has a right to alter it, and
a constitution that can be changed by the legislature gives the people no security against
legislative encroachments on their rights.” Id. at 139.
38. Id. (“The idea that government received its authority from the people was not
new . . . . In 1780, however, Massachusetts transformed popular sovereignty from a
theory to a process.”).
39. LABAREE, supra note 34, at 313 (“To a remarkable degree the Constitution of
1780 reflected the values and endorsed the aspirations expressed by the generations of
inhabitants who had helped build the commonwealth.”).
40. Notably, the third part of the Massachusetts Constitution, dealing with the
frame of government, was unique because, “[o]nly in Massachusetts did the constitution
feature three separate articles (‘chapters’) for the three main branches of government.”
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 207 (2005).
41. MAIER, supra note 36, at 140.
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Court as a freestanding and vibrant source of protections for indi
viduals against the power of the state.”42
Contained in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, under
Article 12, is the right of all criminal defendants to have the aid and
advice of counsel for his or her defense.43 The right to counsel pro
vision provides that: “every subject shall have a right . . . to be fully
heard in his defence by himself, or his council [sic], at his elec
tion.”44 The SJC has found that the right to be assisted by counsel
is imperative “to insure fundamental human rights of life and lib
erty. It is a right accorded to every defendant, rich or poor.”45
While Article 12 is similar to the Sixth Amendment in that the Sixth
Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense,”46 the SJC has consistently stated “that the right to be as
sisted effectively by counsel is independently guaranteed by art.
12.”47
C. The Right to Counsel in Massachusetts
Much like the Massachusetts Constitution preceded the adop
tion of the United States Constitution, Massachusetts was also
ahead of the U.S. Constitution regarding the appointment of coun
sel to indigent criminal defendants.48 In 1958, the SJC adopted
Rule 10–to be followed by the superior courts–mandating the ap
pointment of counsel in all non-capital felony cases.49 Rule 10’s re
quirement of the appointment of counsel came “five years before
42. Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 25
(2005).
43. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII; Guerin v. Commonwealth, 162 N.E.2d 38, 40
(Mass. 1959) (“The fundamental character of the right of a person accused of a serious
crime to have the aid and advice of counsel is recognized under the . . . [Massachusetts]
Constitution, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights.”).
44. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.
45. Commonwealth v. Appleby, 450 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Mass. 1983) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
47. Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982) (citing Com
monwealth v. Soffen, 368 N.E.2d 1030 (Mass. 1979); Commonwealth v. Davis, 384
N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1978); Commonwealth v. Leslie, 382 N.E.2d 1072 (Mass. 1978)).
48. Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK.
U. L. REV. 887, 888 (1980).
49. Rules of Court, 337 Mass. 812, 813 (1958) (“If a defendant charged with a
noncapital felony appears in the Superior Court without counsel, the court shall advise
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the
proceeding . . . .”).
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[the United States Supreme Court, in] Gideon v. Wainwright, im
posed that obligation on the States.”50
While Rule 10 made it an absolute right of a defendant
charged with a felony to have counsel at every stage of the proceed
ing, Rule 10 also acknowledged “the inherent discretionary power
of any court to appoint counsel” to any indigent defendant regard
less of the crime charged.51 In 1964, the SJC took Rule 10 one step
further, expanding it to include indigent defendants who were
charged with any crime, felony or misdemeanor, in which imprison
ment might result.52 It was not until 1972, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,
that the Supreme Court afforded indigent criminal defendants the
same right under the U.S. Constitution.53
D. Article 12 Precedent
Since 1958, when the SJC adopted Rule 10, the Massachusetts
judiciary has continued to be proactive in affording Massachusetts
citizens the right to have legal counsel, going so far as interpreting
the Massachusetts Constitution more expansively than the U.S.
Constitution.54 The Chief Justice of the SJC, Roderick Ireland,
once stated that the SJC often defers to the Supreme Court, but has
the power to interpret the Massachusetts Constitution more expan
sively than the Supreme Court interprets “basically the same lan
50. Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Mass. 1997) (citation
omitted), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 (2001). In Gideon, the United
States Supreme Court recognized for the first time that the Sixth Amendment’s guaran
tee of the right to counsel is a fundamental right, thus made “obligatory upon the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). The
court reasoned that, “[n]ot only these precedents but also reason and reflection require
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.” Id. at 344.
51. Edward J. Duggan, Counsel for the Indigent Defendant in Massachusetts, 2
BOSTON BAR J. 23, 24 (1958). At the time Massachusetts adopted Rule 10, thirty-nine
other states also required the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in noncapital felony cases. Id. at 28.
52. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d at 1227. The amended text of Rule 10 stated:
If a defendant charged with a crime, for which a sentence of imprisonment
may be imposed, appears in any court without counsel, the judge shall advise
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage
of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to
obtain counsel.
Rules of Court, 347 Mass. 808, 809 (1964).
53. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[N]o person may be impris
oned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial.”).
54. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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guage in the United States Constitution.”55 Chief Justice Ireland
explained that the SJC uses a “blended” methodology in determin
ing whether to defer to the Supreme Court.56 This methodology
takes into consideration the history of the Massachusetts Constitu
tion, text, prior interpretations, and jurisprudence already existing
in the Commonwealth and other states.57 In applying that method
ology the SJC has, in numerous instances, interpreted the Article 12
right to counsel provision to provide greater protection than the
Sixth Amendment.58
The SJC has also been proactive in taking steps to ensure that
indigent criminal defendants have all of the benefits that accom
pany legal representation.59 To this end, the court has strived to
give meaning to their words that “[t]he right to counsel means the
right to effective assistance of counsel.”60 The court’s efforts to en
sure that a defendant receives effective representation can be
traced to the court’s broad protective approach to the attorney-cli
ent relationship.61
One of the SJC’s attempts to safeguard the right to have the
assistance of counsel appears in Commonwealth v. Mavredakis,
where the SJC imposed a duty on police to inform an accused of his
attorney’s effort to render assistance.62 The Supreme Court had al
ready decided the issue and held that under the Fifth and Sixth
55. Ireland, supra note 33, at 407 (quoting District Attorney for the Suffolk Dis
trict v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1247, 1300 (Mass. 1980)).
56. Id. at 409.
57. Id.; see also D. Christopher Dearborn, “You Have the Right to an Attorney,”
but Not Right Now: Combating Miranda’s Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment
Under Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
359, 400-01 (2011) (discussing the factors the SJC uses when interpreting the Massachu
setts Constitution to provide greater protection than the United States Constitution).
58. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 41 (Mass. 2007); Common
wealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178-179 (Mass. 2000); Commonwealth v. Hodge,
434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982).
59. Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Mass. 1997), abrogated
by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 (2001). .
60. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 903
(Mass. 2004).
61. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 42 (discussing the court’s efforts in protecting the attorney-client relationship).
62. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 179. The SJC saw a concrete and substantive dif
ference between “the abstract right to speak with an attorney mentioned in the Mi
randa warnings, and a concrete opportunity to meet ‘with an identified attorney
actually able to provide at least initial assistance and advice.’” Id. at 178. The court
believes that the absence of a duty to inform would encourage and tacitly condone,
“affirmative police interference with the attorney-client relationship.” Id. at 179.
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Amendments the police had no such duty.63 The SJC looked to the
prior interpretations of Article 12, which had afforded more protec
tion than the U.S. Constitution, and concluded that in this instance
Article 12 “requires a higher standard of protection.”64 The court
reasoned that it “prefer[s] to view the ‘role of the lawyer . . . as an
aid to the understanding and protection of constitutional rights,’
rather than ‘as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdo
ers.’”65 The court’s opinion in Mavredakis is just one piece of evi
dence establishing the SJC’s efforts to ensure that criminal
defendants have the benefit of the assistance of counsel.
The SJC has taken steps to ensure that when a defendant has
the assistance of counsel, that assistance is effective.66 In Common
wealth v. Hodge, the defendant, Hodge, alleged ineffective assis
tance of counsel.67 Under Supreme Court precedent, the defendant
had the burden of proving that there was an actual conflict of inter
est that adversely affected his counsel’s performance.68 Conversely,
the SJC held that Hodge only had to show that there was a conflict,
not that the conflict adversely affected his counsel’s performance.69
The court reasoned that “such a fundamental right should not de
63. Id. at 176 (“In Moran [v. Burbine] the United States Supreme Court ruled
that, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . the police had no duty to inform a
suspect of an attorney’s efforts to render legal services when the suspect had not per
sonally requested such legal representation.”).
64. Id. at 178-79. In regard to the text of Article 12, the court concluded that
“[t]he precise wording of art.12 was a subject of debate at the Constitutional Conven
tion of 1779-1780 [and i]t is a standard principle of constitutional interpretation that
‘[a]ll [the] words [of the Constitution] must be presumed to have been chosen advis
edly.’” Id. at 178 (citation omitted) (quoting Town of Mount Washington v. Cook, 192
N.E. 464, 465 (Mass. 1934)). The court went on to note that the text of Article 12 has
often been interpreted broadly. Id. at 178.
65. Id. at 179 (citation omitted) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468
(1986)). Viewing the role of the lawyer in that light, the court acknowledged that ‘the
day is long past . . . where attorneys must shout legal advice to their clients, held in
custody, through the jailhouse door.’” Id. (quoting People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d
923, 929 (Ill. 1994)).
66. See generally Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1247 (Mass. 1982)
(holding that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney had a conflict of interest throughout the representation).
67. Id. at 1248-49.
68. In Cuyler v. Sullivan the United Stated Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment required that the defendant present evidence that there was an actual con
flict of interest, and that the conflict thereafter adversely affected the defendant’s attor
ney’s performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
69. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d at 1249. The court started with the Supreme Court’s stan
dard set out in Cuyler, and then held that even if the defendant could not meet the
burden of Cuyler, the court’s inquiry was not complete, because in this instance Article
12 provides broader protection than that set out in Cuyler. Id.
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pend upon a defendant’s ability to meet such an impossible burden”
to entitle him to a new trial under Article 12.70
The SJC’s efforts to safeguard the attorney-client relationship
were apparent in both Commonwealth v. Hilton 71 and Common
wealth v. Howard.72 In both cases the court provided concrete
meaning to the Supreme Court’s proscription against any “‘know
ing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the ac
cused without counsel being present.’”73 In Hilton, the court held
that a court officer must be viewed as a government agent for pur
poses of determining a violation of the right to counsel.74 Thus, the
court concluded that questioning by a court officer outside the pres
ence of a defendant’s attorney would be an effort to circumvent the
Sixth Amendment and a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.75 Similarly, in Howard, the court held that an investigator
with the Department of Social Services had, because of her status as
a government agent, engaged in “prohibited governmental interro
gation” of the defendant.76
In dealing with other provisions of Article 12, the SJC has simi
larly found Article 12 to be more expansive than the Sixth Amend
ment.77 In Commonwealth v. Amirault, it was the defendant’s
position that Article 12 provided greater protection than the Sixth
Amendment and “by its very words, guarantee[d] a defendant a
face-to-face confrontation.”78 Based on this, the defendant argued
that a unique seating arrangement used for child witnesses denied
him the right to confront the witness against him, face-to-face,
70. Id.
71. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, 400 (Mass. 2005).
72. Commonwealth v. Howard, 845 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Mass. 2006).
73. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 42 (Mass. 2007) (quoting Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
74. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d at 400.
75. Id. at 401. The court reached this decision by placing emphasis on the rules
set out in Massiah and its progeny, which stand for the proposition that after the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches anyone acting on the government’s behalf is for
bidden from eliciting information from the accused. Id. at 399. By including court of
ficers in the group of government officials the prohibition applies to, the court put to
rest the concern that secret interrogation tantamount to government interrogations
would be taking place. Id. at 399.
76. Commonwealth v. Howard, 845 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (Mass. 2006). The court’s
decision in Howard was based on the principles set forth in Hilton. Id. at 372. Again,
the court relied on the Supreme Court’s command in Massiah and the ever-present
concern with “the constitutional implications of questioning on matters concerning
pending charges” by agents of the state. Id.
77. Commonwealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Mass. 1997).
78. See id. at 658.
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thereby violating Article 12.79 The court agreed with the defendant
and held that Article 12 was broader than the Sixth Amendment in
that it guaranteed a defendant a face-to-face confrontation.80
In contrast to the cases in which the SJC has found that Article
12 was more expansive than the Sixth Amendment, in Common
wealth v. Whelton, the SJC deferred to the Supreme Court’s reading
of the Sixth Amendment.81 Whelton examined whether the admis
sion of hearsay evidence, under the spontaneous utterance excep
tion, without a showing that the declarants were unavailable,
violated the defendant’s Article 12 right to confront the witnesses
against him.82 The court considered its prior holdings, finding it dispositive that in regards to the hearsay rule, it had consistently held
“that art. 12 provide[d] no greater protection than the Sixth
Amendment.”83 The court also placed emphasis on the fact that
the defendant failed to provide any evidence to support his position
that “art. 12 provide[d] greater protection against hearsay than the
Sixth Amendment.”84 Therefore, the court concluded that in this
instance, Article 12 was not more expansive than the Sixth
Amendment.85
II.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, BEFORE
MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA

AND

AFTER

The SJC’s precedent regarding the Article 12 right to counsel
discussed in Part I.D establishes that the SJC has taken a broad
protective approach to the right to counsel. This approach stems
from safeguarding the attorney-client relationship and a defen
dant’s right to rely on the assistance of counsel at all critical stages
of a criminal prosecution, including post-arraignment interroga
79. Id. at 656.
80. Id. at 662 (holding that “[w]e have no doubt that the seating arrangements in
these cases violated the confrontation rights of the accused under art. 12 . . . [t]he wit
ness must give his testimony to the accused’s face, and that did not happen here”).
81. Commonwealth v. Whelton, 696 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Mass. 1998). The spontane
ous utterance exception to the hearsay rule allows an otherwise inadmissible statement
to be admitted into evidence “‘if its utterance was spontaneous to a degree which rea
sonably negated premeditation or possible fabrication and if it tended to qualify, char
acterize and explain the underlying event.’” Id. at 544 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Crawford, 629 N.E.2d 1332, 1334 (Mass. 1994)).
82. Id. at 543.
83. Id. at 545.
84. Id.
85. Id. (holding “that art. 12, like the Sixth Amendment . . . does not require a
showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial before a statement is admit
ted under the spontaneous utterance exception to the rule against hearsay”).
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tions. For a more complete understanding of the SJC’s approach, it
is necessary to compare Article 12 with the Sixth Amendment, and
the Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana.86 This Note
argues that application of the Montejo decision in Massachusetts
courts would be inconsistent with the SJC’s efforts to protect Arti
cle 12, and that therefore the Massachusetts judiciary should con
tinue to afford Massachusetts citizens greater protection than their
federal counterparts.
Part II discusses both the past and present state of federal law
in the right to counsel context beginning with the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment and ending with the
Court’s opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana.87 On the journey to
Montejo, this section addresses Maine v. Moulton 88 and Michigan v.
Jackson;89 cases decided a year apart during a time when the Su
preme Court placed limits on the government’s efforts to circum
vent the right to counsel. This section then concludes with a recent
Massachusetts case that grapples with the implications that Montejo
has for state courts.
A. The Road to Michigan v. Jackson
Under Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Amendment at
taches once adversarial proceedings have been initiated against a
defendant, and guarantees a defendant the right to “have counsel
present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.”90 Be
cause the Court views the arraignment as the initiation of adver
sarial proceedings against an accused, the arraignment is considered
the event that triggers the Sixth Amendment’s protection.91 After
an arraignment, “the adverse positions of government and defen
dant have solidified” and the defendant is “immersed in the intrica

86. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009).
87. Id.
88. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
89. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S.
Ct. at 2091.
90. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085. Stressing the importance of the Sixth Amend
ment right to counsel the Court has stated that: “[t]he right to the assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to the fair ad
ministration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.” Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168-69.
91. Jackson, 475 U.S at 629.
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cies of substantive and procedural criminal law,”92 complexities
which the law presumes a defendant cannot handle on his own.93
In Maine v. Moulton, the Supreme Court placed limits on the
investigatory rights of the government by holding that once the
Sixth Amendment attaches the government has “an affirmative ob
ligation to respect” it.94 That affirmative obligation mandates that
the government cannot “act in a manner that circumvents” the
Sixth Amendment95 and assures the defendant “the right to rely on
counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the state.”96 The Court in
Moulton acknowledged the government’s investigatory right after
arraignment, but held that it is limited by, and must yield to, the
defendant’s right to counsel.97 Therefore if the government, in an
effort to investigate an accused, knowingly and intentionally cir
cumvents the defendant’s right to counsel, the government has vio
lated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.98
A year after the Supreme Court set out the boundaries of the
right to counsel in Moulton, the Court placed further limits on the
government’s investigatory rights under the Sixth Amendment in
Michigan v. Jackson.99 The Jackson Court addressed whether the
defendants “validly waived their right to counsel at the post-ar
92. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189
(1984)).
93. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633 n.7.
94. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. The Court further stated “[o]nce the right to coun
sel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it. This means more
than simply that the State cannot prevent the accused from obtaining the assistance of
counsel.” Id. at 170-71.
95. Id. at 171. To this end, “[t]he determination whether particular action by
state agents violates the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel must be made in
light” of the affirmative obligation not to circumvent the accused’s right to counsel. Id.
at 176. Applying this standard, the Court in Moulton held that the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right was violated when the police arranged to record conversations be
tween the defendant and an agent of the state. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. The policy behind this type of rule is to prevent “abuse by law enforce
ment personnel in the form of fabricated investigations [thereby] risk[ing] the eviscera
tion of the Sixth Amendment right.” Id. at 180. To this end, the Court—quoting from
Spano v. New York—inquired “‘what use is a defendant’s right to effective counsel at
every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in
the absence of counsel until he confesses?’” Id. at 171 (quoting Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959)).
99. See generally Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), overruled by
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009) (holding that any waiver made by a
defendant of the right to counsel in a post-arraignment police-initiated interrogation is
invalid).
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raignment custodial interrogations.”100 This issue prompted the
Court to consider whether the rule established in Edwards v. Ari
zona, aimed at protecting Fifth Amendment rights, applied equally
to a Sixth Amendment context.101 The rule in Edwards prohibited
police from further interrogating a suspect in custody once the sus
pect had invoked his right to speak with an attorney.102
After considering the applicability of the Edwards rule, the
Court looked at the lawyer’s role in the post-arraignment con
text.103 The Court stressed that the justifications for not allowing
police to interrogate unrepresented suspects after they have asked
to speak with a lawyer are even stronger once adversarial proceed
ings have been initiated and a lawyer has been appointed.104 Rely
ing on Maine v. Moulton’s holding that affords defendants the right
to rely on their attorney as an intermediary between them and the
government,105 the Court stated that after an accused has been
charged, the right to counsel mandates that “the police may no
longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncoun
seled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier

100. Id. at 630. There was no issue in Jackson over whether the defendant had a
right to counsel at the post-arraignment police-initiated interrogation because “[t]he
existence of that right is clear. It has two sources. The Fifth Amendment protection
against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interroga
tions. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides the
right to counsel at post-arraignment interrogations.” Id. at 629 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 626. The rule established in Edwards was rooted in the Fifth Amend
ment’s protection against self-incrimination and the request for counsel in Edwards was
made directly to the police during the custodial interrogation. Id. at 630. In contrast to
Edwards, the defendant in Jackson, made his request for counsel to the judge during
the arraignment, “and the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court opinion was the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel” not the Fifth Amendment as in
Edwards. Id.
102. Id. at 626.
103. Id. at 631-33. The government had argued in Jackson that applying an Ed
wards rule to a Sixth Amendment context would not be appropriate due to the “differ
ences in the legal principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Id. at 631.
The Court disagreed with the government, stating that the purpose behind the Edwards
rule, protecting an unrepresented accused, is just as, if not more important in a Sixth
Amendment context when the accused is now a represented defendant. Id. Therefore,
the court determined that post-arraignment interrogations, require at least as much pro
tection as is given in a pre-arraignment interrogation. Id. at 632.
104. Id. at 631.
105. Id. at 632 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The Court
reasoned that after formal proceedings have been initiated the individual goes from
being a “suspect” to an “accused”—entitling the accused to more constitutional protec
tion. Id.
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stage of their investigation.”106 The Court then created a brightline rule, analogous to the rule in Edwards, prohibiting police-initi
ated post-arraignment interrogations and making any waiver of the
right to counsel in such interrogations presumptively invalid.107
B. The Downfall of Jackson: Montejo v. Louisiana
The Jackson bright-line rule prohibiting police-initiated postarraignment interrogations met its demise in 2009 when the Su
preme Court, sua sponte,108 considered whether Jackson should be
overruled.109 In Montejo v. Louisiana, the defendant, Jesse
Montejo, was arrested in connection with a murder and robbery
and was appointed counsel at a preliminary hearing as required
under Louisiana state law.110 Later that same day, the police went
to the prison where Montejo was being held and convinced him to
accompany them on an expedition to find the murder weapon.111
Thereafter, Montejo signed a Miranda waiver, waiving his right to
have counsel present, and during the expedition wrote an inculpa
tory letter of apology that was admitted into evidence at his trial.112
Notably, Montejo did not meet his court-appointed attorney until
after he returned from the police excursion and wrote the inculpa
tory letter.113
106. Id. After laying out the principles as to why a defendant should be entitled
to just as much Sixth Amendment constitutional protection as a suspect, the Court con
cluded that, “the difference between the legal basis for the rule applied in Edwards and
the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases actually provides additional support
for the application of the rule in these circumstances.” Id.
107. Id. at 635. Relying on Edwards for the decision, the Court said: “[j]ust as
written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request
for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify policeinitiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis.”
Id. It is important to note that under Edwards, and Jackson, if the accused initiates
“communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police,” subsequent to his invo
cation of the right to counsel, the waiver can be deemed valid. Id. at 626 (quoting
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)). What both Edwards and Jackson
protect against, are police-initiated interrogations. Id.
108. The term sua sponte means “[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own
motion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (9th ed. 2009).
109. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009).
110. Id. at 2082. At the preliminary hearing, the judge appointed Montejo an
attorney without a request by Montejo; Montejo stood mute during the entire proceed
ing. Id. at 2083.
111. Id. at 2082.
112. Id. Montejo objected to the admittance of the letter of apology at trial. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis added) (“Only upon their return did Montejo finally meet his
court-appointed attorney, who was quite upset that the detectives had interrogated his
client in his absence.”).
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Under the bright-line rule established in Jackson, Montejo’s
waiver should have been presumptively invalid.114 However, the
Supreme Court, in overruling Jackson, held that a defendant may
waive his right to counsel as long as the waiver is made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.115 In so holding, the majority rejected
the dissent’s view that there was a categorical distinction between
an unrepresented defendant and a represented one.116 The major
ity reasoned that there are “three layers of prophylaxis” that pro
tect the right to counsel in a custodial interrogation, and therefore
the rule in Jackson was considered unnecessary.117
The Court in Montejo believed overruling Jackson was appro
priate because the slight benefits of the Jackson rule substantially
outweighed the “costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal
justice system.”118 The Court stated that the purpose of Jackson
was to prevent police from badgering represented defendants into
waiving their right to counsel, which was adequately served by Mi
randa and Edwards. 119 Under Miranda and Edwards, if a repre
sented defendant did not want to speak to the police outside his
counsel’s presence, all he had to do was say so.120 The main cost
the Court saw was that the rule deterred the government from at
tempting to obtain voluntary confessions, thus making it more
114. Id. at 2083. The Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished Jackson, pointing
out that Jackson required the defendant to request the appointment of an attorney
before its protections were triggered. Id. Since the judge appointed Montejo counsel
without a request by Montejo, Jackson’s protections were not triggered. Id.
115. Id. at 2091-92.
116. Id. at 2092. Justice Stevens writing for the dissent believed that, “[i]f a de
fendant is entitled to protection from police-initiated interrogation under the Sixth
Amendment when he merely requests a lawyer, he is even more obviously entitled to
such protection when he has secured a lawyer.” Id. at 2095 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 2090.
Under Miranda’s prophylactic protection of the right against compelled selfincrimination, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to
have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right. Under
Edwards’s prophylactic protection of the Miranda right, once such a defen
dant “has invoked his right to have counsel present,” interrogation must stop.
And under Minnick’s prophylactic protection of the Edwards right, no subse
quent interrogation may take place until counsel is present, “whether or not
the accused has consulted with his attorney.”
Id. at 2089-90 (citations omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484
(1981)).
118. Id. at 2091.
119. Id. at 2089-90.
120. Id.
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likely that the guilty would go free.121 Therefore, the Court con
cluded, the Jackson rule did not “pay its way.”122
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in Jackson and
wrote a strong dissent in Montejo.123 Writing for the dissent, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the purpose of the Jackson rule was not to
prevent police badgering, but rather “to safeguard a defendant’s
right to rely on the assistance of counsel.”124 Further, because the
decision to waive the right to counsel is a “momentous one,” Justice
Stevens believed that Miranda warnings, while adequate to inform
Montejo of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, were insuf
ficient to ensure that Montejo was aware of the consequences of
waiving his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.125 Stevens thought
that the majority’s decision to overrule Jackson caused irreparable
harm to the “integrity of the . . . right to counsel,” and that even
under pre-Jackson law, Montejo’s Sixth Amendment right to coun
sel was violated.126
C. Montejo’s Applicability to the States
State courts have been grappling with the Montejo decision127
due to the substantial change it wrought in Sixth Amendment
121. Id. at 2090-91.
122. Id. at 2091 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 n.6 (1984)).
Notably, the decision in Montejo was 5-4. Id. at 2081.
123. Id. at 2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626
(1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092.
124. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2097 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also stated that
Jackson’s purpose was to “‘protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations with
his adversary’ by giving him ‘the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between
him[self] and the State.’” Id. at 2096 (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631
32 (1985)).
125. Id. at 2100-01. Stevens believed that the Majority accused Jackson of doing
the same thing the Majority did with their holding in Montejo: blurring the line between
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 2100. The Majority “commit[ed] the same
error by assuming that the Miranda warnings given in this case, designed purely to
safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, were somehow ade
quate to protect Montejo’s more robust Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (em
phasis added).
126. Id. at 2101. The “pre-Jackson” law Stevens was referring to was the prece
dent established in Maine v. Moulton that
makes clear that “the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains
incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to
have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state
agent.” The Sixth Amendment entitles indicted defendants to have counsel
notified of and present during critical confrontations with the state throughout
the pretrial process.
Id. at 2099 (citation omitted) (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
127. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 38 So.3d 188, 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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law.128 Explicit in the Montejo ruling is the right of each individual
state to exercise its power through judicial federalism and continue,
under the state constitution, “to abstain from requesting interviews
with represented defendants when counsel is not present.”129 Thus,
although Montejo resolved the issue under the Sixth Amendment, it
did not resolve the issue under the parallel right to counsel provi
sions in state constitutions.130
Following the Supreme Court’s recognition that states could
continue abstaining from police-initiation post-arraignment interro
gations, the state court decisions have been split as to whether
Montejo should be followed.131 The dispositive factor for the state
courts has been whether the defendant has relied on the right to
counsel provision in the state constitution or its federal counterpart,
the Sixth Amendment.132 Notably, the power to afford greater pro
tection under the state constitution has been fully discussed in only
three state courts: Wisconsin,133 Florida,134 and Massachusetts.135
128. See People v. Vickery, 229 P.3d 278, 281 (Colo. 2010) (recognizing that due
to Montejo “[t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel has undergone substantial changes”).
129. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089; see also Williams, 38 So.3d at 192 (“Al
though Montejo resolved the issue under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Su
preme Court acknowledged that the states were free to continue prohibiting these types
of police-initiated interrogations under their own constitutions.”).
130. Williams, 38 So.3d at 192.
131. Compare Vickery, 229 P.3d at 281 (holding Montejo should be followed),
with Williams, 38 So.3d at 193 (considering “state constitutional claims . . . under the
assumption that our high court will adhere to its precedent, despite Montejo”).
132. See Ex parte Cooper, 43 So.3d 547, 548, 550-51 (Ala. 2009) (holding that
after Montejo, when a defendant pursues a Sixth Amendment argument “a court must
no longer presume a waiver of a right to counsel executed after the right to counsel has
attached is invalid”); Vickery, 229 P.3d at 280-81 (holding that because Vickery argued
that the interrogation violated Sixth Amendment rights, Montejo is controlling and
“[a]fter Montejo we cannot presume waiver is involuntary simple because the defen
dant is represented by counsel for pending charges”); Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.2d 330,
335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that due to defendant’s reliance on Jackson and
the pursuit of a Sixth Amendment argument, Montejo is controlling, making defen
dant’s waiver valid).
133. State v. Forbush, 796 N.W.2d 741, 754-55 (Wis. 2011). In State v. Forbush,
the trial court found that the post-arraignment, police-initiated interrogation of Forbush
violated his right to counsel, but the appellate court, relying on Montejo, reversed the
decision. Id. at 754. The case then made it to the Wisconsin Supreme Court where the
court read Montejo as only applying in cases where the defendant had not invoked his
right to counsel. Id. Because Forbush had invoked his right to counsel prior to interro
gation, the court concluded that Edwards was controlling and Edwards prohibited in
terrogating “a defendant who has invoked his right to counsel.” Id. at 757. While the
outcome of Forbush was accurate, the applicability of the Edwards rule was not. Nota
bly, the Edwards rule only applies “when an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484
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While Montejo changed Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,136
state courts must decide if Montejo also altered state law regarding
the right to counsel. In July of 2010, the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals decided a case that was factually similar to Montejo.137 In
Commonwealth v. Tlasek, Tlasek was arrested in connection with a
housebreak and subsequently interrogated by the police while he
was in custody, awaiting arraignment.138 At the time of his arrest
and interview, the police were aware that Tlasek was represented
by counsel regarding drug charges from a different case, but did not
notify Tlasek’s counsel.139 Failing to notify Tlasek’s counsel, the
police secured a Miranda waiver from Tlasek and then proceeded
to ask him questions relating solely to the pending drug charges.140
At trial for the drug charges, the judge denied Tlasek’s motion
to suppress the statements he made during the police interroga
tion.141 The trial court reasoned that Tlasek’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had not attached because the purpose of the inter
85 (1981) (emphasis added). In Forbush the court found that because Forbush had
invoked his right to counsel, the Edwards rule was controlling. Forbush, 796 N.W.2d at
757. However, Forbush invoked his right to counsel prior to the custodial interrogation,
not during, as required for Edwards to apply. Id. at 744. Therefore, Edwards did not
prohibit the questioning, and Forbush would have had to re-invoke his right to counsel
during the interrogation for Edwards to apply, contrary to the court’s opinion. Id. at
757 (stating that “Forbush was not required to ‘re-invoke’ his right to counsel when the
investigators initiated interrogation”).
134. Williams, 38 So.3d at 192. In Williams v. State, the defendant argued that the
police-initiated interrogation violated his right to counsel under both the Florida and
United States Constitutions because it occurred outside of his counsel’s presence. Id. at
190. Observing Montejo’s acknowledgment that “states were free to continue prohibit
ing these types of police-initiated interrogations under their own constitutions,” the
court noted that “‘the decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court are not, and
should not be dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provi
sions of state law.’” Id. at 192. Ultimately, the court did not address whether the
waiver of Williams’ right to counsel was valid under the Florida Constitution, finding
that Williams never initially invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 193.
135. Commonwealth v. Tlasek, 930 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
136. Vickery, 229 P.3d at 281.
137. Tlasek, 930 N.E.2d at 171.
138. Id.
139. Id. While Tlasek was “in custody, but before he had been arraigned on the
Canton housebreak, the Canton police came unannounced to interview” Tlasek at the
jail where he was being held. Id.
140. Id. During the interrogation Tlasek made inculpatory statements. Id. Im
mediately after making the statements he acknowledged his error stating, “‘he knew
that he shouldn’t have spoken with [the Canton police] and now he’s hurt his [drug]
case’”; Tlasek then ended the interview. Id. Notably, throughout the interview the
police asked no questions relating to the housebreak, which was the basis for Tlasek’s
arrest and interrogation. Id.
141. Id. at 172.
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rogation was to question him about the housebreak, charges on
which he had not been arraigned.142 On appeal, the court held that
Tlasek’s Sixth Amendment right had attached, but that under
Montejo Tlasek had waived it by signing the Miranda waiver.143
The appellate court made it clear that “[Tlasek’s] waiver of his
Sixth Amendment right [did] not mean that he also necessarily
waived his parallel right under art. 12.”144
Although the court recognized that Tlasek had not automati
cally waived his Article 12 right to counsel, the court did not ad
dress the issue further,145 because on appeal Tlasek relied solely on
a Sixth Amendment argument, even though Montejo had made that
argument moot.146 Therefore, the court concluded that the Article
12 issue was not properly before them.147
This recognition by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, that
Tlasek’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right did not automatically
imply that he waived his Article 12 right, serves as the basis for the
remainder of this Note. This Note argues that based on prior Mas
sachusetts case law concerning Article 12 and the Massachusetts ju
diciary’s steps to preserve the attorney-client relationship,
Massachusetts citizens should continue to be afforded greater pro
tection under Article 12 than that currently afforded by the
Montejo opinion.
III. WISHING TO ABSTAIN: INTERPRETING ARTICLE 12
PROTECT THE SANCTITY OF THE ATTORNEY
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

TO

Part III of this Note analyzes the Massachusetts judiciary’s af
firmative steps in safeguarding the sanctity of Article 12 by taking a
broadly protective approach to the attorney-client relationship.
This Note argues that based on this approach the Massachusetts
judiciary should continue to construe Article 12 as requiring a
bright-line rule that prohibits police-initiate interrogations in the
142. Id.
143. See id. Implicit in the court’s holding that Tlasek waived his Sixth Amend
ment right is the fact that it had attached at the time of the police interview. Id.
144. Id. at 172-73.
145. Id. at 173.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 173 n.6. However, the court did discuss that in prior cases the SJC has
held that Article 12 affords Massachusetts citizens greater protection than that provided
by the Sixth Amendment. Id.
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post-arraignment context and rejects Miranda waivers in the same
context.
The initial question that must be addressed in deciding whether
Massachusetts should afford their citizens greater protection than
that afforded by Montejo is: does the rule in Montejo “adequately
protect[ ] the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts?”148 When this
question is answered in the affirmative, there is no need to create a
separate state law rule.149 This Note argues that the Montejo rule
does not adequately protect the citizens of Massachusetts. The re
mainder of the Note will show why the federal rule is inadequate.
The starting point in answering this question is an evaluation of the
text of Article 12 and its federal counterpart, the Sixth
Amendment.
The textual similarities between the right to counsel provisions
in Article 12 and the Sixth Amendment are striking.150 By their
words, both guarantee an accused the right to have counsel for his
defense.151 Article 12 provides that “every subject shall have a
right . . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council
[sic], at his election.”152 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment provides
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”153 Even
though the texts are alike, textual similarities alone do not create a
presumption that Massachusetts courts should defer to Supreme
Court precedent.154 Rather, textual similarity is but one factor to
be taken into consideration along with the “history . . . [and] prior
interpretations of art. 12, as well as the jurisprudence existing in the
Commonwealth.”155
Although there may not be any notable textual difference be
tween Article 12 and the Sixth Amendment, the history of Article
148. Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 177-78 (Mass. 2000).
149. Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d. 58, 69 (Mass. 2010).
150. Article 12’s right to counsel provision provides that: “every subject shall
have a right to . . . be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council [sic], at his
election.” MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII. The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part pro
vides: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.
152. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art XII.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
154. See Leavens, supra note 20, at 97 (stating that “[t]here may be principled
reasons for a state court to find different, more protective meaning for a common norm
and to impose its version of that norm within its state, but it is almost never because the
state and federal provisions have significantly different text”) (emphasis added).
155. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 41 (Mass. 2007).
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12 coupled with prior interpretations by the SJC compel the conclu
sion that the SJC should afford Massachusetts citizens greater pro
tection than provided by Montejo.
A. Safeguarding the Attorney-Client Relationship
If Massachusetts were to follow the Montejo rule it would un
dermine the safeguards the SJC has long recognized as important to
the protection of the attorney-client relationship. Through the
adoption of court rules156 and case law, the Massachusetts judiciary
has taken a stance on ensuring defendants have the benefit of legal
representation and have not tolerated tactics by the police aimed at
circumventing Article 12.
One of the SJC’s efforts to ensure that a criminal defendant’s
right to rely on the assistance of counsel is not circumvented by the
government appears in Commonwealth v. Manning.157 In Manning,
the SJC preserved the attorney-client relationship by finding that
efforts by drug enforcement agents “to induce the defendant to be
come an inform[ant],” without notice to the defendant’s attorney,
violated the defendant’s right to counsel.158 In so holding, the court
stated that “[i]t is clear that [inducing] conduct amounted to unwar
ranted interference with the relationship between the defendant
and his attorney. There is no justification for the Government to
attempt to deal with the defendant behind the back of his coun
sel.”159 Finding the conduct by the government agents to be so
egregious, the court contemplated adopting “a per se rule which
would mandate the dismissal of an indictment in cases in which gov
156. See supra Part I.C.
157. Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 N.E.2d 635, 636, 638 (Mass. 1977).
158. Id. at 636. In addition to urging the defendant to become an informant, the
drug enforcement agent also “[d]uring the course of the conversation, . . . ‘made several
disparaging remarks about [Manning’s] counsel and the manner in which he was con
ducting the defense of the . . . case’ and ‘indicated that the tactics of defense counsel
would not insure the defendant being kept out of jail.’” Id. at 636.
159. Id. at 637. The Commonwealth argued that the defendant was required to
“show that he was actually prejudiced by the agents’ conduct” and because the defen
dant could not show that, “any error was harmless.” Id. at 638. The court rejected the
Commonwealth’s argument and held that it
need not invoke a presumption of prejudice, as implicit in the motion judge’s
finding that there have been no “serious” impairment of the attorney-client
relationship is a finding that the defendant had in fact been prejudiced to some
extent. “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations of prejudice arising
from its denial.”
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)).
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ernment agents intentionally attempt to subvert the attorney-client
relationship.”160 The court decided against the per se rule but cau
tioned that “we wish to leave no doubt that such conduct will not be
tolerated in our criminal justice system.”161 This warning by the
court makes the SJC’s protective view of the attorney-client rela
tionship undoubtedly apparent.
Another instance in which the SJC has taken affirmative steps
to safeguard the attorney-client relationship can be found in Com
monwealth v. Mavredakis.162 In Mavredakis, the SJC’s holding that
police officers had a duty to inform a suspect of an attorney’s ef
forts to render assistance163 was grounded in protecting the attor
ney-client relationship.164 In deciding not to defer to the Supreme
Court’s holding that police had such a duty, the SJC said that the
federal rule “would lend tacit approval to affirmative police inter
ference with the attorney-client relationship”165—something the
court was unwilling to do.166 In Mavredakis, the court stated that
when an accused accepts an attorney’s assistance during interroga
tion, “the police must suspend questioning until the suspect is af
forded the opportunity to consult with the attorney.”167
Analogously, if Montejo were followed in Massachusetts, it would
allow police to question a defendant who has already accepted an
attorney’s assistance, and has not yet had the opportunity to speak
with his attorney.
160. Id. at 639.
161. Id.
162. Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 179 (Mass. 2000).
163. Id. (holding that “the duty we announce concerns solely the obligation ‘to
apprise the defendant of a specific communication from his attorney that bore directly
on the right to counsel’”) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446,
453 (Conn. 1988)).
164. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 42 (Mass. 2007) (discussing
the efforts the SJC has taken in safeguarding the attorney-client relationship).
165. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 179. To that point, the court further went on to
adopt recognitions by other jurisdictions that
there is an important difference between the abstract right to speak with an
attorney . . . and a concrete opportunity to meet “with an identified attorney
actually able to provide at least initial assistance and advice.” “Faced with a
concrete offer of assistance . . . a suspect may well decide to reclaim his or her
continuing right to legal assistance.”
Id. at 178-79 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Haynes, 602
P.2d 272, 278 (Or. 1979) and State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 453 (Conn. 1998)).
166. Id. at 176 (recognizing that under Moran “police had no duty to inform a
suspect of an attorney’s efforts to render legal services when the suspect had not per
sonally requested such legal representation”) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
422, 432 (1986)).
167. Id. at 180.

188

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:163

Allowing the police to question a defendant who has already
accepted an attorney’s assistance would have numerous negative
consequences. Notably, putting the Montejo rule into practice
would render being represented in a custodial interrogation more
burdensome than being unrepresented. For example, under
Mavredakis when a suspect accepts an attorney’s offer of assistance
during a custodial interrogation the police must halt questioning
and cannot resume until the suspect speaks with the attorney.168
Under a Montejo fact pattern, at the time the interrogation takes
place, defendants have already accepted and invoked their right to
counsel at arraignment, but have yet to speak with their counsel.
Before the police have a duty to halt the interrogation under
Montejo, the defendant has to re-invoke his right to counsel during
the interrogation.169 Thus a represented defendant has a higher
burden than an unrepresented suspect, which requires the repre
sented defendant to invoke the right to counsel twice: once at ar
raignment and again during the interrogation.
Adherence to the Montejo rule would encourage police con
duct aimed at circumventing Article 12, namely, interrogating de
fendants who have just been arraigned, but have yet to have the
opportunity to speak with their attorney. When an accused is first
brought into a custodial interrogation, pre-arraignment, the police
have the opportunity to question him. In Montejo, the defendant
was questioned all afternoon, evening, and then into the next morn
ing.170 After the accused becomes a charged defendant, and has
secured an attorney, the only foreseeable benefit of allowing the
police to interrogate him is to give the police another chance at
obtaining a confession. However, in the post-arraignment context,
this confession comes at the hands of the police circumventing the
defendant’s “right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him
and the State.”171
In attempting to obtain a post-arraignment confession the po
lice are interfering with the relationship between the defendant and
168. Id.
169. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009). “[A] defendant who
does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much
when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not only
must the immediate contact end, but “badgering” by later requests is prohibited.” Id.
While this is true, thinking that they have already invoked their right to counsel at
arraignment, most defendants will not be learned enough to know that they must again
invoke it at the interrogation for their right to counsel to be respected and upheld.
170. Id. at 2082.
171. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
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his attorney, thereby degrading the safeguards the Massachusetts
judiciary has put in place to protect that relationship. Such a result
would be a digression for the Massachusetts judiciary and, there
fore, post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations should con
tinue to be prohibited.
Admittedly, there may come a time when an “emergency” situ
ation arises in which time is crucial, and a defendant’s attorney can
not be contacted prior to the questioning. However, those
situations should be rare, and if an emergency situation arises a de
fendant should be notified, prior to questioning, that his attorney
was not contacted before the defendant is asked to sign a Miranda
waiver. Additionally, the defendant’s attorney should be contacted
at the first opportunity. Aside from that exception, once a defen
dant’s Article 12 right to counsel attaches, there should be a blanket
prohibition on police-initiated interrogations of represented de
fendants, thus advancing the SJC’s efforts to protect the attorneyclient relationship.
B. Circumvention of Article 12
The SJC has not only taken steps to safeguard the attorneyclient relationship, but also to ensure that law enforcement does
“not . . . act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the
protection afforded by the right to counsel.”172 In Hilton and How
ard, the SJC expanded upon the Supreme Court’s efforts to stop
law enforcement from confronting defendants without their coun
sel’s knowledge.173 There, the court classified both social work
ers174 and court officers as “government agents”175 in an effort to
protect a defendant’s right to rely on the assistance of counsel when
communicating with the government.
Relying on Hilton, a Massachusetts Superior Court in Com
monwealth v. Blagojevic reaffirmed the “broad prohibition” against
efforts by law enforcement targeted at eliciting inculpatory state
ments from represented defendants.176 Notably, the court’s holding
that after the time of arraignment, the police were “obligated to
172. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, 398 (Mass. 2005) (quoting Maine
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985)).
173. Commonwealth v. Howard, 845 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Mass. 2006); Hilton, 823
N.E.2d at 400-01; see supra Part I.D.
174. Howard, 845 N.E.2d at 372-73.
175. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d at 400.
176. Commonwealth v. Blagojevic, No. 06-302, 2007 WL 969079, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2007).
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refrain from any effort to question [the defendant] . . . in the ab
sence of his counsel” was not rooted in the Jackson rule, but rather
Massachusetts precedent and Maine v. Moulton.177
Logically, holdings not based on Jackson should not be af
fected by the Montejo rule. However, the Blagojevic holding,
prohibiting post-arraignment police interrogations in Massachu
setts, is in danger of being overruled if Montejo were to be fol
lowed. Montejo permits what Blagojevic explicitly prohibits: the
questioning of defendants after arraignment without their counsel’s
knowledge.178 In requesting counsel, or securing private counsel,
the defendant should be interpreted as saying, “I only want to com
municate through my attorney.” By expressly choosing to have the
assistance of counsel, a defendant invokes his right to rely on the
assistance of counsel for the duration of litigation. Allowing the
police to initiate interrogations of defendants after their Article 12
invocation negates their express choice. Thus, adherence to
Montejo would undermine the rules the Massachusetts judiciary has
put in place to preserve a defendant’s choice to have counsel.
C. Miranda Warnings—Grossly Inadequate
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona held that the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination carries with it
certain procedural safeguards.179 Under Miranda, an individual in
custody has the right to consult with an attorney and have an attor
ney present during interrogation.180 Thus, with Miranda, the Su
preme Court created “what may be best described as the ‘Miranda
right to counsel,’” independent from the right to counsel guaran
teed by the Sixth Amendment and Article 12.181 While the Court
created this Miranda right to counsel, its only real purpose was to
protect a suspect’s right to remain silent, and therefore “is [signifi
cantly] narrower than the full-blooded Sixth Amendment” and Ar
ticle 12 right to counsel.182 The Miranda right to counsel is nothing
177. Id. at *2.
178. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2083, 2091 (2009) (discussing the Jack
son rule, and Jackson’s overruling now means that Montejo allows post-arraignment
police-initiated interrogations).
179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
180. Id.
181. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 417 (4th ed. 2006).
182. Id. Recognizing that due to Miranda’s narrower application, “[i]t is neces
sary to treat the Miranda and Sixth Amendment versions of the right to counsel sepa
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more than a prophylactic safeguard,183 while the right to counsel in
both Article 12184 and the Sixth Amendment is a “fundamental”
constitutional right.185
The holding in Montejo rests on the belief that Miranda warn
ings adequately apprise defendants of the Sixth Amendment rights
they are giving up,186 even though Miranda was designed to protect
defendants’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.187
Thus, the Montejo Court concluded that “doctrines ensuring volun
tariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the
voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver.”188 Justice Stevens,
in his dissenting opinion in Montejo, adamantly argued that Mi
randa warnings were inadequate to ensure “that a defendant pos
sess ‘a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’”189
Article 12 guarantees criminal defendants the right to have
counsel for their defense.190 It gives a defendant the right to choose
between two options: (1) to proceed with an attorney or (2) to elect
to proceed without an attorney and represent himself.191 Article 12
is enforced through SJC Rule 3:10, which requires the judge to ad
rately. They attach at different times, under different circumstances, for different
reasons, and with different effects.” Id.
183. Id. at 416.
184. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 903
(Mass. 2004).
185. Jennifer Diana, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh My! Fellers, the Sixth
Amendment, and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 1007
(2005) (discussing the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
186. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009) (reasoning that be
cause Miranda warnings “suffice[ ] to protect the integrity of ‘a suspect’s voluntary
choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence’ before his arraignment, it is hard to
see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment, when
Sixth Amendment rights have attached”) (citation omitted) (quoting Texas v. Cobb, 532
U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
187. Id. Interestingly, the Court acknowledged the fact that Miranda was de
signed to protect an accused’s Fifth Amendment right, but dismisses this glaring distinc
tion as “irrelevant.” Id.
188. Id. at 2089-90 (referring to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153
(1990)).
189. Id. at 2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
421 (1986)). Stevens believed that because the Miranda warnings were insufficient to
ensure Montejo understood the right he was giving up, “the record in this case provide[d] no basis for concluding that Montejo validly waived his right to counsel, even in
the absence of Jackson’s enhanced protections.” Id.
190. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.
191. See id.
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vise a defendant of his constitutional right to have an attorney
available to him “at public expense if necessary.”192
For a defendant to effectuate a waiver of the right to counsel at
an arraignment or similar proceeding, “the waiver must ‘be volun
tary’ and must involve ‘an informed and intentional relinquishment
of a known right.’”193 When a defendant elects to proceed pro se,
the judge must ensure that the defendant has “a sense of the magni
tude of the undertaking and the disadvantages of self-representa
tion.”194 Moreover, a defendant must be fully apprised of “the
seriousness of the charge and of the penalties he may be exposed to
before deciding to take a chance on his own skill.”195 Inherent in
the right of a defendant to proceed pro se is the judicial recognition
that average defendants are not capable of representing
themselves.196
1. Post-Arraignment Waiver
The decision to waive one’s Article 12 right to counsel in a
post-arraignment custodial interrogation context is also a monu
mental decision. While the defendant is not completely waiving his
right to counsel for the remainder of the criminal prosecution, he is
waiving counsel at a stage deemed to be “critical.”197 Similar to
when a defendant waives his right to counsel at an arraignment and
elects to proceed pro se, in a custodial interrogation the defendant
must waive his right to counsel on an informed and intentional ba
sis, with the knowledge of the right he is giving up.198
Waiving the right to counsel at a police-initiated custodial in
terrogation is a decision that can shape the rest of the criminal pro
ceedings. More importantly, it is a decision that could dictate the
outcome of the accused’s trial: “[g]iven the realities of modern
criminal prosecution, the critical proceedings at which counsel’s as
192. Rules of the Court, 416 Mass. 1301, 1309 (1993) (successor of original rule).
193. Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 656 (Mass. 2009) (quoting Com
monwealth v. Torres, 813 N.E.2d 1216, 1276 (2004)).
194. Commonwealth v. Lee, 475 N.E.2d 363, 368 (Mass. 1985) (quoting Maynard
v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976) (internal quotations omitted)).
195. Id.
196. Commonwealth v. Martin, 683 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Mass. 1997) (recognizing
“the obvious truth that the average defendant lacks the skill necessary to protect one
self in a criminal proceeding”).
197. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009).
198. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749, 756 (Mass. 2007) (“‘To be
valid, [a] waiver must be voluntary, and there must be an informed and intentional
relinquishment of a known right.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 813 N.E.2d
1261, 1276 (2004)).
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sistance is required more and more often occur outside the court
room in pretrial proceedings ‘where the results might well settle the
accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.’”199 In
Montejo, after the defendant gave the Miranda waiver, he wrote a
letter of confession that was admitted against him at trial and ulti
mately led to his conviction and subsequent death sentence.200
Due to the consequences that waiving the right to counsel can
have, post-arraignment waivers of the right to counsel are scruti
nized closely in Massachusetts. In Commonwealth v. Anderson, the
SJC was faced with a defendant who had been assigned counsel, but
had not yet met his counsel when he initiated contact with the po
lice.201 During the custodial interrogation, Anderson signed a Mi
randa waiver after being apprised of the fact that he had been
assigned counsel.202 Ultimately, the court upheld the waiver, find
ing it conclusive that the defendant was the one who initiated the
contact.203 In reaching that conclusion the court stated that a postarraignment waiver of the defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel in
a custodial interrogation “without the benefit of counsel’s presence
or advice is particularly suspect.”204 Notably, even when the defen
dant initiates contact with the police, every reasonable presumption
199. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2099 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quot
ing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)). Justice Stevens analogizes the
Court’s decision in Wade, which held a post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of
criminal proceedings based on the belief that counsel’s presence was imperative, to the
post-arraignment custodial interrogations. Id. Further, in Moulton, the Court recog
nized that “to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more
damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 170 (1985) (emphasis added).
200. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082.
201. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 756-57.
202. Id. at 757. The police were aware of the fact that the defendant’s attorney
had requested that they not interview the defendant because the attorney had sent the
police a letter that stated: “‘no attempt should be made to interrogate Mr. Anderson or
to obtain any physical or documentary evidence from him without my knowledge and
express approval.’” Id. at 754. Further, the SJC stated that the case would have been
decided differently under Article 12 if the defendant had not been informed of his
counsel’s entry into the case or that his counsel requested that he not be interviewed.
Id. at 757. If that had been the case, “[a] waiver obtained in such circumstances would
not be knowing and intelligent within the meaning of art. 12.” Id.
203. Id. at 756-57.
Anderson initiated contact with [the police] after learning of his indictment;
was advised fully of his Miranda rights, including his right to consult with
counsel and to have counsel present . . . [i]n these circumstances, the judge’s
conclusion that Anderson intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel . . . was constitutionally sound.
Id.
204. Id. at 758.
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against waiver is given.205 Nevertheless, in that case, the Miranda
waiver was upheld due to the defendant initiating contact with the
police.
In factual situations similar to Montejo and Jackson, where the
defendants do not initiate contact with the police and have not yet
met their respective attorneys, Miranda warnings are grossly inade
quate to ensure that defendants are knowledgeable about the Arti
cle 12 right they are giving up. In a pre-arraignment custodial
interrogation in which the right to counsel has not yet attached,206
Miranda warnings adequately apprise a suspect of the right he is
giving up by speaking to the police, that is, the right against selfincrimination. But, in the post-arraignment context, when Article
12 has attached207 and the accused is represented by counsel, the
accused is now a charged defendant, and the Miranda warnings
which were sufficient pre-arraignment become inadequate to fully
inform a defendant of the Article 12 right he is surrendering.
The facts of both Montejo and Jackson bring to light the inade
quacies of Miranda warnings in a post-arraignment context. In
Montejo and Jackson neither defendant had the opportunity to
meet, let alone speak to, his attorney before the police sought him
out for interrogation, knowing the defendant had been appointed
counsel.208 At the time, Montejo, Jackson, and Bladel signed their
respective Miranda waivers they surely were not fully aware of the
seriousness of their charges and the legal ramifications of speaking
with the police outside of the presence of each of their attorneys. If
waivers are viewed as “particularly suspect”209 by the SJC even
when the defendant initiates contact with the government,210 they
should be wholly invalid when the police initiate contact, especially
in cases in which the defendant has not even had the opportunity to
receive any legal advice whatsoever.
The most efficient and adequate way to ensure that repre
sented defendants who do not initiate contact with the police are
adequately protected is to continue to prohibit police-initiated in
terrogations of represented defendants. By adhering to this prohi
205. Id.
206. In a pre-arraignment custodial interrogation, Article 12 has not yet been
triggered due to the fact that “judicial proceedings [have not] commenced.” Id. at 756.
207. In the post-arraignment context the “judicial proceedings” have commenced
and therefore the Article 12 right to counsel has attached. See id.
208. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 (2009); Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625, 627-28 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091.
209. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 758.
210. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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bition, the courts would not have to indulge in the game of deciding
when a waiver of the right to counsel is or is not valid in a postarraignment custodial interrogation. Consequently, all waivers of
counsel in such a setting would be automatically invalid and there
fore inadmissible in court.
2. Changing Miranda
An alternative to a blanket prohibition would be to modify the
Miranda warnings for post-arraignment waivers. In Common
wealth v. Anderson, the police advised Anderson during the inter
rogation of “his right to consult with counsel and to have counsel
present” and the fact that an attorney from the Committee for Pub
lic Counsel Services had been appointed to represent him.211 Find
ing the warnings to be sufficient, the court went on to place
emphasis on the police explicitly telling Anderson of his attorney’s
entry into the case.212 Anderson is distinguishable from cases such
as Montejo because Anderson was unaware that he had been as
signed an attorney until the time of the interview. However, the
more extended warnings from Anderson can be used as a starting
point to alter the Miranda rule.213
Anderson warnings would inform defendants that: (1) they
have already been appointed counsel; (2) they have the right to
consult with their counsel; (3) they have the right to have counsel
present before speaking with the police; (4) their counsel is not
aware of the current interrogation; and (5) by signing the Miranda
waiver, they are saying that they want to talk to the police without
notifying their attorney.214 The Anderson court believed that such
211. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 757.
212. Id. Importantly, at the time Anderson’s attorney had been assigned to the
case, Anderson had not requested counsel and therefore did not know prior to the
interview of his attorney’s entry. Id. at 745.
213. Id.
214. The proposed “Anderson warnings” are modified to fit cases with facts simi
lar to Montejo. Unlike in Anderson, the defendant in Montejo was aware that an attor
ney was going to be appointed for him. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082
(2009). In Anderson, the police were aware that Anderson’s attorney did not want
Anderson interrogated outside of his presence, and the police advised Anderson of
that, but in a factual setting such as Montejo, a defendant’s attorney is not aware of the
interrogation so the police would not need to advise the defendant of the attorney’s
supposed view of the interrogation. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 757. However, for the
warnings to be effective the police would need to notify defendants like Montejo, that
their attorneys are unaware of the interrogation, and the legal ramifications of talking
to the police.
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a warning would effectively ensure that a defendant was aware of
the Article 12 right he was waiving.215
IV.

WHEN WISHING FAILS: THE BROAD IMPLICATIONS
OF MONTEJO

The previous section established that the Massachusetts judici
ary’s broad interpretation of Article 12 was aimed at protecting the
attorney-client relationship. Part IV brings to light the broad impli
cations that post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations would
have on the citizens of Massachusetts.
In Commonwealth v. Lavallee, the SJC stated that “[t]he duty
to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants belongs to the
State, and the State is in the best position to enforce that duty.”216
Furthermore, since the State is in the best position to enforce the
duty to provide counsel, the State should also be in the best posi
tion to oversee that the protections that come with it are upheld. If
a rule by the Supreme Court inadequately protects the right to
counsel, Massachusetts courts should continue to afford their citi
zens greater protection under Article 12. This section will examine
1) the impact that following Montejo’s lead would have on suscepti
ble defendants and 2) the loophole that Montejo has created for the
police, arguing that due to both of these factors, the Montejo rule
inadequately protects a defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel.
A. Susceptible Defendants
The Montejo opinion relies on the assumption that defendants
are adequately capable of facing the government on their own:
“[a]ny criminal defendant learned enough to order his affairs based
on the rule announced in Jackson would also be perfectly capable
of interacting with the police on his own.”217 However, that as
215. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 757. While changing the Miranda warnings is an
alternative, it would be impractical and burdensome to create another set of warnings
that apply solely to post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations. Continued adher
ence to the rule prohibiting post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations would take
no effort at all, and would continue to provide a bright-line easy-to-apply rule for law
enforcement. The magnitude of the decision to waive the assistance of counsel, as well
as the repercussions of effectuating such a waiver brings to light the reality that a Mi
randa waiver does not fully apprise a defendant of the Article 12 right he is surrender
ing, thus requiring the conclusion that Massachusetts should continue to adhere to the
rule prohibiting such interrogations.
216. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 907
(Mass. 2004).
217. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089.
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sumption is flawed in two respects. First, it negates the belief that
“[t]he simple fact that [the] defendant has requested an attorney
indicates that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of
dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly.”218 Second, it does not
take into account that Miranda warnings are confusing to not only
the average defendant, but also “vulnerable defendants”219 in the
context of post-arraignment custodial interrogations.
The Supreme Court has a long-standing belief that the legal
system is complex to even the most educated and sophisticated de
fendants.220 If the intelligent and educated defendants are ill
equipped to face the legal system on their own, “how much more
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intel
lect?”221 Recently in 2010, the American Psychology-Law Society
218. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 n.7 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129
S. Ct. at 2091 (2009) (quoting People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d 56, 67 (Mich. 1984)). Addi
tionally, the Court adopted the belief that, “[w]hen an accused requests an attorney,
either before a police officer or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional
right he is invoking; he therefore should not be expected to articulate exactly why or for
what purposes he is seeking counsel.” Id. (quoting Bladel, 365 N.W.2d at 67).
219. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07
1529), 2009 WL 1007119, *3. Reference to “vulnerable defendants” comes from the
amici brief filed in support of Petitioner, Montejo:
The Jackson rule ensures that the right to assistance of counsel does not be
come a meaningless abstraction, easily lost when police confront the defen
dant outside the presence of counsel. . . . [C]oncerns undergirding the Jackson
rule are magnified for particularly vulnerable defendants, including the men
tally and developmentally disabled, juveniles, those lacking education, those
with substance addiction, and the indigent. These defendants are especially
vulnerable to police suggestion that counsel is unnecessary, many such defend
ants lack the capacity to appreciate the importance of counsel . . . .
Id. at *2-3 (emphasis added); see also Dearborn, supra note 57, at 373 (finding that
“[t]he great weight of evidence indicates most suspects do not understand their Mi
randa rights and are therefore unable to waive them validly without first speaking to
counsel”).
220. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (recognizing that, “[e]ven the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law
. . . [h]e requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him”) (emphasis added).
221. Id.; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (holding that
“[t]he Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safe
guards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’ It embodies a realistic recogni
tion of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional
legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life
or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.
That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman,
may appear intricate, complex and mysterious”).
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published an Article dealing with police-induced confessions and
Miranda warnings,222 finding that
studies have repeatedly shown that a substantial proportion of
adults with mental disabilities, and “average” adolescents below
age 16 have impaired understanding of Miranda warnings when
they are exposed to them. Even adults and youth who under
stand them sometimes do not grasp their basic implications.223

Due to their inability to understand the warnings, vulnerable de
fendants were found to be more susceptible to waiving their
rights.224
Given the reality that even average defendants are perplexed
by Miranda warnings, in the post-arraignment setting when a defen
dant has already secured a lawyer it is “confusing and counterintui
tive” for defendants to be told that they have the right to have an
attorney appointed.225 Not only is it confusing, but coupled with
the fact that vulnerable defendants already have an “impaired un
derstanding of Miranda warnings”226 it is imperative that such de
222. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recom
mendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3 (2010) (discussing the issue of false confes
sions i.e., innocent people who had falsely confessed and were then convicted at trial).
The Article noted that
some studies have found that poor comprehension of Miranda warnings is it
self predictive of a propensity to give false confessions. Sometimes this stems
from a desire to comply; at other times it appears to be related to a naı̈ve
belief that one’s actual innocence will eventually prevail—a belief that is not
confined to adolescents or persons with disabilities.
Id. at 19 (citations omitted). Given the correlation between an impaired understanding
of Miranda warnings and false confessions, what value does a false confession add to
the “truth seeking process?” Ensuring that in the post-arraignment context defendants
have the benefits of their legal counsel during a police-initiated interrogation would cut
down on the likelihood of false confessions attributed to an impaired understanding of
Miranda warnings. A defendant’s counsel would be able to fully explain to a defendant
all of the negative consequences that waiving Miranda rights could have, and therefore
would lead to a better comprehension of Miranda warnings.
223. Id. at 14-15.
224. Id. at 19 (finding that vulnerable defendants “often lack the capacity to
weigh the consequences of rights waiver, and are more greatly susceptible to waiving
their rights as a matter of mere compliance with authority”).
225. See Emily Bretz, Note, Don’t Answer the Door: Montejo v. Louisiana Re
laxes Police Restrictions for Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, 109 MICH. L. REV.
221, 244-45 (2010) (arguing that “[t]he fact that, post-Montejo, represented defendants
have to repeatedly reassert their desire to have an attorney present during interrogation
is confusing and counterintuitive, not only for the average defendant, but especially for
those who are more vulnerable”).
226. Kassin et al., supra note 222, at 14-15; see also Dearborn, supra note 57, at
362-63 (advocating for “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach the moment
Miranda warnings are required” due to suspects’ impaired understanding of Miranda).
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fendants have an opportunity to consult with their attorney prior to
any police-initiated custodial interrogation. Interpreting Article 12
to allow post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations in the ab
sence of a defendant’s attorney would inadequately protect repre
sented defendants. Further, it would negate the defendant’s choice
to proceed with the help of an attorney, a choice that is protected
by Article 12 and that is in place to protect a defendant at critical
confrontations with the government.227
B. The Montejo Loophole: Non-Custodial Interrogations
By overruling Jackson, the Montejo Court left the door open
for police to interrogate represented defendants, not only in a cus
todial setting, but also in a non-custodial setting, where a defendant
has no Miranda protections.228 Part of the rationale for overruling
Jackson was the Court’s belief that it was superfluous, because Mi
randa and its progeny sufficiently protected a defendant’s right to
counsel.229 However, Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick: “appl[y]
only in the context of custodial interrogation”230 making the Jack
227. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749, 755-56 (Mass. 2007) (recogniz
ing that “art. 12 confer[s] the right to the assistance and advice of counsel in order to
protect the unaided layman at critical confrontations with the government after being
charged with a specific crime”).
228. See Todd C. Berg, U.S. Supreme Court Expands Police, ‘Interrogation’
Power, Overruling 23-Year-Old Decision, MICH. LAWYERS WEEKLY, June 1, 2009
(“Montejo’s biggest impact will be felt by those defendants who aren’t in jail . . . .
Because the ‘protections of Miranda and Edwards expire when a defendant is released
from custody,’ . . . Jackson used to pick up the slack by deterring the police from trying
to interrogate defendants. Now, under Montejo . . . those same defendants are ‘fair
game.’”).
229. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089-90 (2009).
230. Id. The Court in Montejo found it irrelevant that Miranda and its progeny
were, “designed to protect Fifth Amendment, not Sixth Amendment, rights” because
“[w]hat matters is that these cases, like Jackson, protect the right to have counsel dur
ing custodial interrogation.” Id. at 2090 (emphasis added). However, if a defendant is
not in custody, then Miranda does not apply:
Montejo also correctly observes that the Miranda-Edwards regime is narrower
than Jackson in one respect: The former applies only in the context of custo
dial interrogation. If the defendant is not in custody then those decisions do
not apply; nor do they govern other, noninterrogative types of interactions
between the defendant and the State (like pretrial lineups).
Id.; see also Richard W. Bishop, Constitutional Defenses—Confessions, 17B MASS.
PRAC., PRIMA FACIE CASE § 53.136 (5th ed., 2010) (“Miranda warnings are required
only when interrogation is custodial in nature. A person in custody is not entitled to
Miranda warnings unless he is subjected to interrogation or its functional equivalent.”);
Bretz, supra note 225 at 237 (discussing that “[b]ecause Miranda referred specifically to
custodial interrogations, only defendants in police custody are entitled to its protec
tions, and to the related rights guaranteed by Edwards v. Arizona”).
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son rule in a non-custodial interrogation not only necessary, but
imperative to preserve a defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel.
The phrase “custodial interrogation” refers to “‘questioning in
itiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.’”231 In Commonwealth v. Bryant, the SJC found
that a confession obtained by the police that “took place during a
friendly chat in the defendant’s home” was non-custodial in na
ture,232 and consequently, the Miranda requirement was not trig
gered.233 Notably, at the time the non-custodial interrogation took
place the defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel had not attached.
If it had, the Jackson rule would have prohibited the police from
interrogating the defendant, regardless of whether it was a non-cus
todial interrogation.
If Massachusetts were to follow Montejo, no constitutional
safeguards would protect represented defendants in a non-custodial
interrogation from the police coming to their door and interrogat
ing them. The Montejo Court was of the belief that these types of
non-custodial interrogations “are the least likely to pose a risk of
coerced waivers.”234 However, recent studies have found “that
231. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 459 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Mass. 1984) (recognizing
that “police are not required to give [Miranda] warnings every time they interview a
witness, but only when the witness is in ‘custody’”). In determining whether “the inter
rogation has taken place in custodial circumstances” the SJC has stated,
[t]he difficulties inherent in determining whether a given confrontation be
tween suspect and police is appropriately characterized as custodial derive
from the necessity of answering what is essentially a subjective inquirywhether, from the point of view of the person being questioned, the interroga
tion took place in a coercive environment-by reference to objective indicia.
Id.
232. Id. at 798.
233. Id. The SJC spelled out four factors that are taken into account in determin
ing whether an interrogation is custodial in nature:
(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation has begun to
focus on the suspect, including whether there is probable cause to arrest the
suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview
was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the sus
pect; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the
suspect was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation
or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview
terminated with the defendant’s arrest.
Id. Applying those factors to the case the court found that: the interrogation took place
in the defendant’s home, “the interview itself was informal, and the questioning unag
gressive” therefore leading the court to conclude that the interrogation was non-custo
dial in nature. Id.
234. Montejo, 129 S.Ct at 2090. To that point, the Court went on to qualify their
belief, “[w]hen a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his
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since Miranda, police have intentionally focused their efforts on se
curing inculpatory statements from defendants in non-custodial in
terrogations.”235 Adherence to Montejo would promote police
conduct aimed at targeting represented defendants in a non-custo
dial setting, in hopes of obtaining a confession.
Moreover, continued adherence to Jackson provides an easy
to-apply bright-line rule. The SJC has recognized that “difficulties
[are] inherent” in deciding whether an interrogation was custodial
or non-custodial.236 Adherence to Jackson would eliminate those
difficulties by prohibiting police-initiated interrogations of repre
sented defendants regardless of whether the interrogation was cus
todial or non-custodial in nature. Even the majority in Montejo
conceded that “[a] bright-line rule like that adopted in Jackson en
sures that no fruits of interrogations made possible by badgeringinduced involuntary waivers are ever erroneously admitted at
trial.”237
C. Right to Initiate Contact
While this Note argues that Massachusetts should prohibit po
lice-initiated interrogations of represented defendants, it does not
foreclose the right of the defendant to initiate contact with the po
lice. If a defendant contacts the police without notifying his coun
sel, he does so at his own risk. In Commonwealth v. Anderson,
following the Jackson rule, the SJC noted that “‘nothing . . . pre
vents a suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel
[from] . . . speak[ing] with police in the absence of an attorney.”’238
When the defendant initiated contact with the police he had
the opportunity to consult with his counsel before doing so,239 and
therefore the concerns that are present when the police initiate con
tact are not as apparent. However, even though a defendant can
initiate contact with the police, it is important to recognize that any
waiver of counsel in that defendant-initiated interrogation is still
door or walk away to avoid police badgering. And noninterrogative interactions with
the State do not involve the ‘inherently compelling pressures,’ that one might reasona
bly fear could lead to involuntary waivers.” Id. (citations omitted).
235. Bretz, supra note 225, at 238.
236. Bryant, 459 N.E.2d at 797.
237. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089.
238. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749, 756 (Mass. 2007) (quoting
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990)).
239. Id. at 754-55.
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“particularly suspect.”240 Implicit in this recognition is that regard
less of whether the defendant initiates contact with the police, once
the Article 12 right to counsel has attached and has been invoked
by the defendant, the defendant is unlikely to waive that right
knowingly.
CONCLUSION
The SJC has recognized, time and again, that the Massachu
setts Declaration of Rights can afford its citizens greater protection
than the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.241 The
history of the right to counsel in Massachusetts demonstrates the
Commonwealth’s longstanding record of being proactive in both af
fording indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel before the
United States Supreme Court and expanding the right to counsel
when the Supreme Court has limited it.
When faced with following the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in Montejo, a decision which this Note argues would de
grade the right to counsel, Massachusetts courts should continue
the prohibition that is in place which forbids police-initiated inter
rogations of represented defendants. Any other result would be in
consistent with the steps the SJC has taken to safeguard the
attorney-client relationship and the right of a defendant to rely on
the assistance of counsel at all “critical stages.”242 Certainly society
does have a valid interest in convicting and punishing criminals, but
that right is not absolute nor should it be allowed to trump the con
stitutional right to counsel afforded by Article 12.
Adherence to pre-Montejo law would continue to provide a
bright-line, workable rule. The SJC has said that the purpose of an
exclusionary rule is to: “compel respect for the constitutional guar
anty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it.”243 By continuing the prohibition on police-initiated
interrogations of represented defendants and deeming any waivers
of the right to counsel at those interrogations invalid, Massachusetts
240. Id. at 758 (discussing that, “[a]mong the important circumstances to be con
sidered, of course, are whether the waiver was obtained in a custodial setting and
whether it was obtained either in the absence of counsel’s presence or in the absence of
the defendant’s having had the opportunity to consult with counsel”).
241. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982).
242. Lavalle v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 903 (Mass.
2004) (stating that “[t]he right to counsel extends to every ‘critical stage’ of the criminal
process”); see also supra note 227 and accompanying text.
243. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
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would ensure that the protections afforded by Article 12 do not
become mere abstractions.
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